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DEBRA LYN BASSETT*
Issues of reasonableness arise regularly throughout American law.
Reasonableness is a concept central to tort law, which imposes a reasona-
ble person standard in ascertaining duty. Criminal guilt turns on a rea-
sonable doubt standard. And in civil discovery, the concept of
reasonableness features prominently: discovery's scope reaches informa-
tion that is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence, and discovery cannot be unreasonably cumulative or duplica-
tive. Reasonableness standards require judges to undertake an objective,
rather than subjective, evaluation. E-discovery specifically has two signifi-
cant overarching reasonableness components: reasonable accessibility for
production and reasonable care in preservation and disclosure. The inter-
pretation of these two components plays a central and determinative role
in the effectiveness and burdensomeness in discovering electronically
stored information.
This Symposium Article addresses the first of these two components-
reasonable accessibility- analyzing the guidance available on this issue
from the case law and commentators and concluding that current
approaches to reasonable accessibility often fail to employ the required
objective reasonableness standard. Current approaches tend to err in two
prominent ways: (1) by relying inappropriately on informational classifi-
cations, and (2) by merging distinct standards into a single standard. Of
particular significance, Federal Rule 26 creates a twofold reasonableness
interpretation- both with respect to what constitutes reasonable accessibil-
ity and also with respect to what constitutes undue burden or expense.
However, rather than undertaking an objective, fact-specific inquiry of
reasonable accessibility, some courts are relying on categories for presump-
tive accessibility or inaccessibility. In addition, many courts appear to be
evaluating "undue burden or expense" as one conflated standard that con-
siders only cost.
* Justice Marshall F. McComb Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School.
Many thanks to the Campbell Law Review for inviting me to participate in this e-discov-
ery symposium, and to Rex Perschbacher for his comments on a previous draft.
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INTRODUCTION
"Reasonableness" is a common standard in American law, used in
both civil and criminal contexts. Its popularity is perhaps somewhat
surprising in light of its imprecise meaning. Black's Law Dictionary
defines "reasonable" as "[flair, proper, just, moderate, suitable under
the circumstances" and "[flit and appropriate to the end in view."'
However, the term's lack of precision is perhaps precisely the reason
for its popularity, as it permits the flexibility to accord judgment based
on what seems fair under the facts and circumstances of the particular
case. Moreover, despite lacking a precise and specific meaning, rea-
sonableness standards serve the purpose of requiring the use of an
objective, rather than subjective, standard of evaluation.2
Despite our familiarity with reasonableness standards, e-discovery
is a bit unusual with respect to the number of reasonableness stan-
dards layered into the evaluative process. The basic overarching scope
of discovery in civil actions as a general matter requires that the infor-
mation sought be "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence, ' 3 and also dictates that discovery cannot be
"unreasonably cumulative or duplicative."4  When e-discovery is
sought as part of general civil discovery, additional reasonableness
standards come into play: reasonable accessibility for production,5 rea-
sonable care in preservation,6 reasonable inquiry in terms both of
requesting e-discovery and in responding to such a request,7 and rea-
sonable care in disclosure."
These layers of reasonableness indeed give courts the flexibility to
fashion and tailor e-discovery procedures, requests, and responses to
fit the particular fact-specific circumstances in an attempt to achieve a
proper result. However appealing this flexibility might appear on its
face in terms of achieving individualized fairness or justice, underlying
concerns remain. "Fairness" and "justice" are themselves flexible
1. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1138 (5th ed. 1979).
2. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) ("[Tlhe reasonableness stan-
dard usually requires, at a minimum, that the facts . . . be capable of measurement
against 'an objective standard' ...."); ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 579
F.3d 143, 152 (2d Cir. 2009) (referring to the "objective reasonableness standard").
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i).
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1), 33-35.
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 2 6 (g)(1).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B); see also FED. R. EvID. 502 (providing that the disclo-
sure of privileged information does not constitute a waiver of the privilege under spec-
ified circumstances).
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terms that often shift with perspective. What seems fair and just from
a plaintiff's perspective may differ when evaluated from a defendant's
perspective. One of law's purposes is to provide consistency and pre-
dictability so that actors may conform their behavior to what is legally
required. Initially, vague standards such as reasonableness face legal
challenges; but over time, as such legal challenges are raised, evalu-
ated, and ruled upon, definite standards emerge and gain acceptance.
As a relatively recent concept, e-discovery's reasonableness stan-
dards are still developing. The significance of these standards, how-
ever, can hardly be overestimated. The interpretation of these
reasonableness standards will determine both the effectiveness and the
burdensomeness of discovering electronically stored information. The
ramifications are, in short, crucial to the success of the federal discov-
ery devices. The ubiquitous nature of electronic documents and com-
munications renders discovery of such information, to the extent
relevant, necessary for the effectiveness of the discovery process. How-
ever, the massive numbers of electronic documents and communica-
tions raise issues of burdensomeness that, if left unchecked, can result
in exorbitant expense and inconvenience.
Commentators have addressed a number of e-discovery issues,
but have tended to focus primarily on the impact of the amended Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure9 (which now include specific references
to electronically stored information) or on the impact of new Rule 502
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 10 This Article addresses an issue
more neglected in the legal literature to date: the precondition of rea-
sonable accessibility.
Rule 26(b)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contains
a dual reasonableness interpretation that creates flexibility in the origi-
nal assessment as to whether electronically stored information is, or is
not, reasonably accessible. Current court approaches tend to employ
categories of sources characterized as presumptively accessible or pre-
sumptively inaccessible, together with a conflation of the two alterna-
tives for challenging or confirming the presumptive categorization. I
conclude that both of the foregoing constitute error. The courts' use of
9. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Allman, Conducting E-Discovery After the Amendments: The
Second Wave, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 215 (2009) (discussing the impact of e-discovery
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery
& Beyond: Toward Brave New World or 1984?, 25 REv. LITIG. 633 (2006) (same).
10. See, e.g., Henry S. Noyes, Federal Rule of Evidence 502: Stirring the State Law of
Privilege and Professional Responsibility with a Federal Stick, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
673 (2009) (discussing the impact of new Federal Rule of Evidence 502 pertaining to
privilege and waiver in e-discovery).
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presumptive categories violates the objective reasonableness standard
that the rule commands; the conflation of the alternative challenges
compounds the danger of using presumptive categories and rewrites
the rule to provide only one alternative rather than applying the rule as
written. These errors are especially problematic due to the discovery
context. The vast majority of discovery issues do not result in a pub-
lished opinion, which reduces the amount of interpretive guidance
available from thoughtful judicial decisions, so the relatively few pub-
lished decisions carry disproportionate influence. In addition, the
lack of direct appeal from discovery rulings increases the likelihood
that litigation may take a course (such as settlement) that concomi-
tantly reduces the likelihood of eventual appellate guidance.
Part I of this Article explains the source of the reasonable accessi-
bility requirement and its potential interpretations." Part II analyzes
the guidance on this issue that is available from case law and commen-
tators.'2 Part III concludes that current approaches to reasonableness
standards in e-discovery often fail to employ an objective standard and,
accordingly, proposes an alternative approach to reasonable accessibil-
ity more consistent with the language of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.' 3
I. THE REASONABLE AcCESSIBILITY REQUIREMENT
Rule 26 imposes, as a specific limitation on the discovery of elec-
tronically stored information, a precondition of reasonable accessibil-
ity. The rule provides, in pertinent part:
A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information
from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because
of undue burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for a protec-
tive order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that
the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden
or cost. If that showing is made, the court may nonetheless order dis-
covery from such sources if the requesting party shows good cause,
considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C). The court may spec-
ify conditions for the discovery. 4
The Advisory Committee's note explains that information systems
"are designed to provide ready access to information used in regular
ongoing activities. They also may be designed so as to provide ready
access to information that is not regularly used. But a system may
11. See text accompanying infra notes 14-17.
12. See text accompanying infra notes 19-53.
13. See text accompanying infra notes 54-74.
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
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retain information on sources that are accessible only by incurring
substantial burdens or costs. ' 15 The note explains that a responding
party should provide responsive electronically stored information that
is "relevant, not privileged, and reasonably accessible," and that often
information from those sources that are reasonably accessible will be
sufficient.1 6 However, the Advisory Committee did not attempt to
define reasonable accessibility beyond the rule's reference to undue
burden or cost, and stated only that "[i]t is not possible to define in a
rule the different types of technological features that may affect the
burdens and costs of accessing electronically stored information."17
The rule's use of "undue burden or cost" as the only articulated
distinction between that which is reasonably accessible and that which
is not invites an inquiry as to how reasonable accessibility relates to
burden and cost, and whether challenges to discovery requests seeking
electronically stored information are limited to relevancy, privilege,
and claims of undue burden or cost. The next part of the discussion
addresses this inquiry by analyzing the guidance available from case
law and commentators.
II. INTERPRETATIONS OF REASONABLE ACCESSIBILITY
If electronically stored information is not reasonably accessible,
the information is sheltered from discovery absent a showing of good
cause.18 Accordingly, the meaning of the term "reasonably accessible"
has significant implications for e-discovery.
The first sentence of the reasonable accessibility provision, stand-
ing alone, might initially lead one to believe that the holder of electron-
ically stored information wields a great deal of power over its
classification as reasonably, versus not reasonably, accessible. Indeed,
one commentator has opined that the provision "gives parties the abil-
ity to determine data's accessibility and, therefore, their own produc-
tion responsibilities."'19 Of course, it is important that parties not have
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee's note to 2006 amendments, availa-
ble at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/EDiscovery-w_
Notes.pdf.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
19. Rebecca Rockwood, Comment, Shifting Burdens and Concealing Electronic Evi-
dence: Discovery in the Digital Era, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 16, 9 30 (2006), http://jolt.
richmond.edu/vl2i4/articlel6.pd.
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such control over whether information is deemed accessible,2 ° and the
drafters of Rule 26 built several protections into the rule in an attempt
to avoid such potential. Not only does Rule 26 attempt to restrict
issues of reasonable accessibility to those involving "undue burden or
20. Theodore C. Hirt, The Two-Tier Discovery Provision of Rule 26(b)(2)(B) - A Rea-
sonable Measure for Controlling Electronic Discovery?, 13 RIcH. J.L & TECH. 12, 11 28
(2007), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v13i3/article12.pdf (noting that "several commenta-
tors contend that the rule will be subject to abuse"). Despite these concerns, the
courts have appeared to require more than a party's mere assertion of undue burden or
cost. For example, in Mikron Industries, Inc. v. Hurd Windows & Doors, Inc., No. C07-
532RSL, 2008 WL 1805727 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 21, 2008), the court remarked that
[iun alleging that continued discovery of their [electronically stored informa-
tion, or "ESI"] would be unduly burdensome, defendants offer little evidence
beyond a cost estimate and conclusory characterizations of their ESI as "inac-
cessible." .... Beyond the estimated costs, defendants have not demon-
strated an unusual hardship beyond that which ordinarily accompanies the
discovery process. Therefore, the Court finds that defendants have not met
their burden of demonstrating that the requested ESI is "not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost."
Id. at *2 (quoting FED. R. Ov. P. 26(b)(2)(B)). The District Court of Kansas recently
reached a similar conclusion:
Clearly, there are multiple approaches to electronic discovery and alternatives
for reducing costs and it appears that defendant asserts the highest estimates
possible merely to support its argument that electronic discovery is unduly
burdensome....
The court is not persuaded that defendant has carried its burden of
showing that the discovery is "not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost." .... [D]efendant's cost estimates are greatly exaggerated in
an attempt to fall within the parameters of Rule 26(b)(2)(B).
Spieker v. Quest Cherokee, LLC, No. 07-1225-EFM, 2009 WL 2168892, at *3, 4 (D.
Kan. July 1, 2009) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B)); see also In re Zurn Pex Plumb-
ing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-1958-ADM/RLE, 2009 WL 1606653, at *2 (D. Minn.
June 5, 2009) ("The affidavit of... an attorney [who is] not an expert on document
search and retrieval, is not compelling evidence that the search will be as burdensome
as Zurn avers.").
Instead, the courts have tended to require a detailed showing. See, e.g., Petcou v.
C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-2157-HTW-GGB, 2008 WL 542684
(N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2008) (evaluating cost and accessibility of e-mail by examining num-
ber of employees, employee status as current or former employee, location of e-mail as
on server or backup tapes, the level of examination required in order to respond to the
specific discovery requests, and prior knowledge and retention of specific responsive
e-mail messages); Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 637-38 (D. Kan. 2006)
(analyzing expenses in detail after noting that backup tapes "must be restored before
they can be searched for relevant data[,] . . . [which] suggests that the process of pro-
ducing such data could constitute an undue burden," but emphasizing that "inaccessi-
bility must be 'because of undue burden or cost"' (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B))
(citation omitted) (second emphasis added)).
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cost," but it also places the burden of proof on the party asserting that
the information is not reasonably accessible.2 ' In addition, even if a
party can establish a lack of reasonable accessibility to the court's sat-
isfaction, the court may still order discovery upon a showing of good
cause.2 2 As always, however, the practical interpretation of reasonable
accessibility has fallen to the courts, and the next section reviews the
judicial applications of the reasonable accessibility provision.
A. Reasonable Accessibility in the Case Law
One of the best-known court decisions to address e-discovery is
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC.23 Although Zubulake was penned more
than three years before the electronic discovery amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective,24 its thorough and
thoughtful analysis has aided many subsequent courts facing e-discov-
ery issues.2 5 The central issue in the Zubulake case concerned the dis-
coverability of e-mail messages archived on backup tapes, and if
discoverable, which party should bear the cost of recovering them.26
The Zubulake court offered a lengthy discussion regarding the
attributes of accessible versus inaccessible electronic data, and
observed that
whether production of documents is unduly burdensome or expensive
turns primarily on whether it is kept in an accessible or inaccessible
format (a distinction that corresponds closely to the expense of pro-
duction) .... [TIhanks to search engines, any data that is retained in a
machine readable format is typically accessible.27
"Whether electronic data is accessible or inaccessible," the court con-
tinued, "turns largely on the media on which it is stored. ' 28 Then, the
court identified five categories of data: (1) active, online data,29
21. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
22. See id.
23. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
24. Id. at 309. Zubulake was decided on May 13, 2003. Id. The e-discovery
amendments to the Federal Rules became effective on December 1, 2006. H.R. Doc.
No. 109-105, at 1 (2006), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.
cgi?dbname=109_cong-documents&docid=f:hd1O5.109.pdf.
25. A Westlaw search of citations to the Zubulake decision found 1497 such refer-
ences as of February 3, 2010.
26. Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 312.
27. Id. at 318.
28. Id.
29. Id. As the court explained, "'[o]n-line storage is generally provided by mag-
netic disk" and "is used in the very active stages of an electronic record[']s life-when it
is being created or received and processed, as well as when the access frequency is
20101
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(2) near-line data, 30 (3) offline storage/archives,3 1 (4) backup tapes,"
high and the required speed of access is very fast, i.e., milliseconds."' Id. (quoting
Cohasset Associates, Inc., White Paper, Trustworthy Storage and Management of Elec-
tronic Records: The Role of Optical Storage Technology 10 (Apr. 2003) [hereinafter
Cohasset White Paper]). Examples of online data include hard drives. Id.
30. Id. at 318-19. The court observed that "near-line" data
"typically consists of a robotic storage device (robotic library) that houses
removable media, uses robotic arms to access the media, and uses multiple
read/write devices to store and retrieve records. Access speeds can range
from as low as milliseconds if the media is already in a read device, up to
10-30 seconds for optical disk technology, and between 20-120 seconds for
sequentially searched media, such as magnetic tape."
Id. (quoting Cohasset White Paper, supra note 29, at 11).
31. Id. at 319. The court explained that an offline storage or archival device
is [a] removable optical disk or magnetic tape media, which can be labeled
and stored in a shelf or rack. Off-line storage of electronic records is tradi-
tionally used for making disaster copies of records and also for records con-
sidered "archival" in that their likelihood of retrieval is minimal.
Accessibility to off-line media involves manual intervention and is much
slower than on-line or near-line storage. Access speed may be minutes,
hours, or even days, depending on the access-effectiveness of the storage facil-
ity. The principled difference between nearline data and offline data is that
offline data lacks the coordinated control of an intelligent disk subsystem,
and is, in the lingo, JBOD ("Just a Bunch of Disks").
Id. (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
Subsequent commentary has criticized the use of JBOD as an example of off line
media. See, e.g., Philip Beatty, The Genesis of the Information Technologist-Attorney in
the Era of Electronic Discovery, 13 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 261, 274 (2008). Professor
Beatty argues that Zubulake "incorrectly classif[ies] JBOD ... as offline data, when, in
fact, it is probably best described as active, online data," and contends that "placing
JBOD into category three places it close to the line between accessible and inaccessible
data, when it is properly viewed as one of the most accessible forms of media." Id.
32. Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 319. The court stated that a backup tape is a "'device,
like a tape recorder, that reads data from and writes it onto a tape .... The disadvan-
tage of tape drives is that they are sequential-access devices, which means that to read
any particular block of data, you need to read all the preceding blocks."' Id. (quoting
Webopedia, http://inews.webopedia.com/term/t/tape-drive.html (last visited Apr. 5,
2010)). Therefore, the court explained, "[t]he data on a backup tape are not organized
for retrieval of individual documents or files [because] ... the organization of the data
mirrors the computer's structure, not the human records management structure." Id.
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In making this statement, the court
quoted Kenneth J. Withers, Computer-Based Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation 15
(n.d.) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/
lookup/elecdiOl.pdf/$file/elecdiOl.pdf, and referred to Executive Software, Inc.,
White Paper, Identifying Common Reliability/Stability Problems Caused by File Fragmen-
tation (2002), available at http://www.pmialliance.com/white-paper-data/6.pdf
(identifying problems associated with file fragmentation, including file corruption,
data loss, crashes, and hard drive failures), and Stan Miastkowskj, When Good Data
Goes Bad, PC WORLD, Nov. 17, 1999, available at http://www.pcworld.com/article/
442 [Vol. 32:435
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and (5) erased, fragmented or damaged data.3 3 Of these, the court
explained, "the first three categories are typically identified as accessi-
ble, and the latter two as inaccessible."34 The court elaborated:
The difference between the two classes [accessible and inaccessible] is
easy to appreciate. Information deemed "accessible" is stored in a
readily usable format. Although the time it takes to actually access the
data ranges from milliseconds to days, the data does not need to be
restored or otherwise manipulated to be usable. "Inaccessible" data,
on the other hand, is not readily usable. Backup tapes must be
restored .... fragmented data must be de-fragmented, and erased data
must be reconstructed, all before the data is usable. That makes such
data inaccessible.35
The Zubulake court ultimately concluded that some of the requested
electronic information, stored on backup tapes, was not reasonably
accessible, but nevertheless ordered restoration and production of
responsive documents from a small sample of the backup tapes to
avoid any "exercise in speculation"-the sample would provide both
"tangible evidence of what the backup tapes may have to offer" as well
as "tangible evidence of the time and cost required to restore the
backup tapes. '"36
Subsequent court decisions generally have concurred in Zubu-
lake's assessment that the expense of production corresponds to the
level of accessibility,37 and thus have found Zubulake's formulations
13859/whengooddata__goesbad.html. See Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 319 (citing the
sources just provided but using web addressed that have since become obsolete).
33. Id. at 319. The court explained that
"[wlhen a file is first created and saved, it is laid down on the [storage media]
in contiguous clusters .... As files are erased, their clusters are made availa-
ble again as free space. Eventually, some newly created files become larger
than the remaining contiguous free space. These files are then broken up
and randomly placed throughout the disk." Such broken-up files are said to
be "fragmented," and along with damaged and erased data can only be
accessed after significant processing.
Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Sunbelt Software, Inc., White Paper, Disk
Defragmentation for Windows NT/2000: Hidden Gold for the Enterprise 2 (2000), avail-
able at http://www.diskeeper.com/diskeeper/IDC-White-Paper.pd).
34. Id. at 319-20.
35. Id. at 320.
36. Id. at 324.
37. Although Zubulake discussed accessibility, the discussion was in the specific
context of the propriety of cost-shifting. In particular, Zubulake set forth seven factors
to consider in the cost-shifting determination. Id. at 321-23. Courts regularly cite to
Zubulake's seven-factor analysis even though they sometimes make adjustments to that
analysis in applying it to the case at hand. E.g., OpenTV v. Liberate Technologies, 219
F.R.D. 474, 479 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (assigning different weights to the factors than those
20101
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useful in determining reasonable accessibility within the meaning of
Rule 26(b)(2)(B).38 Some courts have appeared to employ Zubulake's
five categories, and the characterizations of the accessibility of those
five categories, in a conclusory manner.39 Other courts have used the
categories as a starting point but then have applied greater scrutiny.4 °
Some significant discussions of reasonable accessibility appear in
sources other than judicial opinions, so the next section turns to those
additional sources.
B. Discussions of Reasonable Accessibility Outside the Case Law
E-discovery has generated substantial commentary across a num-
ber of areas, including ethics,4 ' cost shifting,42 and general commen-
tary regarding e-discovery and procedural rules.43 Accessibility issues
endorsed in Zubulake); Multitechnology Services, L.P. v. Verizon Southwest, No. Civ.
A. 4:02-CV-702-Y, 2004 WL 1553480, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004) (discussing only
five of Zubulake's seven factors).
38. See, e.g., W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. BeneFirst, LLC, 245 F.R.D. 38, 42-43 (D. Mass.
2007) (applying the Zubulake calculus, which determines "whether the production of
electronic data is expensive or unduly burdensome [based] on whether it is main-
tained in an 'accessible' or 'inaccessible' format," in considering "whether electronic
data is 'reasonably accessible' for purposes of the new Rule 26(b)(2)(B)").
39. See, e.g., Canon U.S.A., Inc. v. S.A.M., Inc., No. 07-01201, 2008 WL 2522087,
at *5 (E.D. La. June 20, 2008) ("Here, the evidence suggests that the requested discov-
ery is retained on a server, and therefore accessible because data stored on servers are
typically machine-readable and in active format.").
40. Consider, for example, the following discussion by the Massachusetts district
court:
In this case, the records sought by the Plaintiffs are stored on [BeneFirst's]
server . . . , which is clearly an accessible format. However, because of
BeneFirst's method of storage and lack of an indexing system, it will be
extremely costly to retrieve the requested data .... [T]he retrieval of the
records will be costly and for the purposes of this decision, I find that such
retrieval would involve undue burden or cost. Accordingly, the images are
not reasonably accessible within the meaning of [Rule] 26(b)(2)(B).
W.E. Aubuchon Co., 245 F.R.D. at 43.
41. See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, E-Pitfalls: Ethics and E-Discovery, 36 N. Ky. L. REV.
449 (2009) (outlining ethical issues arising in e-discovery); Joseph Gallagher, E-Ethics:
The Ethical Dimension of the Electronic Discovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 613 (2007) (conducting a similar discussion).
42. See, e.g., Robert E. Altman & Benjamin Lewis, Cost-Shifting in ESI Discovery
Disputes: A Five-Factor Test to Promote Consistency and Set Party Expectations, 36 N. Ky.
L. REV. 569 (2009) (discussing cost-shifting considerations in e-discovery); Sonia Sali-
nas, Developments in the Law, Electronic Discovery and Cost Shifting: Who Foots the
Bill?, 38 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 1639 (2005) (same).
43. See, e.g., Steven S. Gensler, Some Thoughts on the Lawyer's E-volving Duties in
Discovery, 36 N. Ky. L. REV. 521 (2009) (examining how e-discovery is changing law-
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naturally arise in discussions of cost-shifting due to the prominence of
the Zubulake decision,44 but discussions of accessibility outside of
cost-shifting are uncommon.45
Despite the general lack of commentary addressing accessibility
outside of the cost-shifting context, there are two additional particu-
larly relevant sources that have examined the discoverability of elec-
tronic data. The American Bar Association has published civil
discovery standards, one of which lists factors to consider in ruling on
e-discovery motions.4 ' These factors include whether the responding
party stores electronic data in a format "designed to make discovery
impracticable or needlessly costly or burdensome," and whether the
discovery request would require the responding party, through the cre-
ation of software or other means, "to render inaccessible electronic
information accessible, where the responding party would not do so in
the ordinary course of its day-to-day use of the information. '47 Despite
the references to accessibility and inaccessibility, the ABA Standards
do not provide definitions or classifications.
The Sedona Conference also has published e-discovery guidelines,
recommending that "[t]he primary source of electronically stored
information for production should be active data and information. 48
yers' participation in discovery); Richard Marcus, Only Yesterday: Reflections on
Rulemaking Responses to E-Discovery, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (2004) (examining three
historical changes relevant to e-discovery and the Civil Rules Committee's e-discovery
approach); Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery Beyond the Federal Rules, 37 U. BALT. L. REv.
321 (2008) (examining e-discovery's broad impact and looking specifically at e-discov-
ery in the state courts, federal local rules, and international limitations).
44. See, e.g., Salinas, supra note 42, at 1649-50 (discussing Zubulake and
accessibility).
45. One of the few exceptions is a comment written prior to the formal adoption of
Rule 26(b)(2)(B). See Sarah AL. Phillips, Comment, Discoverability of Electronic Data
Under the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: How Effective Are
Proposed Protections for "Not Reasonably Accessible" Data?, 83 N.C. L. REV. 984, 1014
(2005) (proposing a more strict good cause standard and "delineating electronic data
into three categories: that which is accessible and thus discoverable, that which is not
reasonably accessible and thus discoverable only upon a showing of good cause, and
that which is deleted, which is not discoverable except upon a showing that the
responding party intentionally deleted information to avoid discovery").
46. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CIVIL DISCOVERY STANDARDS 59-61 (2004), available
at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/discoverystandards/2004civildiscoverystandards.
pdf.
47. Id. at 60-61.
48. SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES, RECOMMENDA-
TIONS AND PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC PRODUCTION 45 (Jonathan M.
Redgrave ed., 2d ed. 2007), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/
miscFiles/TSCPRINCP_2nd ed 607.pdf. Principle 9 provides that "absent a showing
20101 445
11
Bassett: Reasonableness in E-Discovery
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2010
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
Pursuant to the Sedona Conference guidelines, such active data and
information is generally discoverable.49 In contrast, "disaster recovery
backup tapes" and "deleted, shadowed, fragmented, or residual" data
or documents generally are not discoverable absent a specified show-
ing.50 The showing necessary for backup tapes is a demonstration of
"need and relevance that outweigh the costs and burdens of retrieving
and processing the electronically stored information from such
sources," 51 while deleted and other residual data require only "a show-
ing of special need and relevance."' 52 Thus, the Sedona Conference's
guidelines classify electronically stored information into categories of
suggested accessibility or inaccessibility, much like the approach in
Zubulake. However, the Sedona Conference recommends additional
"data complexity factors" in accessibility analysis and recognizes that
under some circumstances even active online data can be
burdensome.53
With this background in place, the next part analyzes shortcom-
ings in the current approaches to reasonable accessibility and pro-
poses an alternative more consistent with the drafters' apparent intent.
III. REASONABLE ACCESSIBILITY: CONFLATING DETERMINATIONS
AND ALTERNATIVE DIRECTIONS
In shielding electronically stored information that is not reasona-
bly accessible from discovery, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee
intended to create a flexible rule, adaptable to the specific circum-
stances of each case. Such flexibility has the benefit of adjusting to
individual, unique, or unusual cases, as well as new or updated tech-
of special need and relevance, a responding party should not be required to preserve,
review, or produce deleted, shadowed, fragmented, or residual electronically stored
information." Id. at 49.
49. Id. at 45. Principle 8 provides:
The primary source of electronically stored information for production
should be active data and information. Resort to disaster recovery backup
tapes and other sources of electronically stored information that are not rea-
sonably accessible requires the requesting party to demonstrate need and
relevance that outweigh the costs and burdens of retrieving and processing
the electronically stored information from such sources, including the dis-
ruption of business and information management activities.
Id.
50. Id. at 45, 49 (Principles 8 and 9).
51. Id. at 45 (Principle 8).
52. Id. at 49 (Principle 9).
53. See SEDONA CONFERENCE, COMMENTARY ON PRESERVATION, MANAGEMENT AND
IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCES OF INFORMATION THAT ARE NOT REASONABLY ACCESSIBLE 11
(2008), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/dltForm?did=NRA.pdf.
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nologies. However, in applying this intentionally flexible rule, some
courts are unintentionally undermining the rule's purpose and effec-
tiveness in two ways. First, some courts are inappropriately relying on
categories instead of undertaking the objective reasonableness deter-
mination that the rule requires, which exacerbates existing issues due
to the multiple layers of reasonableness built into the discovery rules.
Second, the language of Rule 26 creates a twofold reasonableness inter-
pretation-both with respect to what constitutes "reasonable" accessi-
bility and also with respect to what constitutes "undue" burden or
expense-but some courts are conflating what ultimately should be
three assessments into one standard, which not only disregards the
rule's directive but also compounds the effect of the use of categories,
effectively creating not just categories of presumptive, but of conclu-
sive, accessibility or inaccessibility. These errors of categories and
conflation are the subjects of the sections that follow.
A. Categories
One of the potential concerns with current approaches to Rule 26
is not the mere fact of a dual reasonableness determination within the
rule; the concern is the failure to acknowledge the dual nature of the
determination. Zubulake was a well written and path-breaking deci-
sion that directly paired accessibility with format. Zubulake was, of
course, examining the specific facts of that particular case in order to
reach an appropriate resolution with respect to the parties to that liti-
gation, and focused on the issue of cost-shifting. The shortcoming
often exhibited in current approaches has nothing to do with any fail-
ure of Zubulake itself, but rather, has to do with the tendency of some
subsequent courts to interpret Zubulake as creating categories of pre-
sumptive accessibility and presumptive inaccessibility. Such an
approach is understandable-Zubulake's categories aid judges who
lack technological savvy by giving them a starting point for analysis.
As a result, subsequent courts often have relied heavily on Zubulake
and its five categories. However, Zubulake was decided before Rule
26(b)(2)(B) became effective, and thus Zubulake was not applying the
rule's provisions. The helpful categories created in the case define
accessibility through format-the accessibility of data is determined by
the format in which the data is stored. The continued use of the Zubu-
lake categories serves to freeze those format categories, despite a con-
stantly evolving and shifting world of electronic technology. Thus, as
discussed above, active online data is presumed reasonably accessible
and backup tapes are presumed not reasonably accessible, even
though these assumptions may be untrue in any given instance and
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may generally become irrelevant or obsolete in the not-too-distant
future. Even to the extent that the categories are correct in any given
instance, it remains crucial, however, to remember that this is step one
and not the final conclusion.
As helpful as Zubulake's categories are, judges must ensure that
the standard-and not just the category-is satisfied. Neither Rule 26
nor the Advisory Committee notes established presumptive categories;
in fact, the Advisory Committee took care to explain that "[ilt is not
possible to define in a rule the different types of technological features
that may affect the burdens and costs of accessing electronically stored
information, '5 4 and further observed that the accessibility or inacces-
sibility of electronic data "may arise from a number of different rea-
sons primarily related to the technology of information storage,
reasons that are likely to change over time. ' 5 Heavy reliance on Zubu-
lake's categories, without more, could unintentionally subvert Rule
26's standard if applied without analyzing the specific case facts. Rea-
sonable accessibility is an objective standard requiring an examination
of the specific case facts, and a court abdicates its responsibilities pur-
suant to Rule 26 if it merely relies on a priori categories as determina-
tive of accessibility.56  The standard under Rule 26 refers to
accessibility "because of undue burden or cost"; the format in which
the data is stored suggests its likely accessibility and may well be tied
to the cost of retrieving it, but the responding party must make an
affirmative showing of the actual burden or cost to satisfy the rule.
Thus, the connection between accessibility and cost discussed in Zubu-
lake probably is an accurate assumption in most cases, but is subject
to three caveats: first, over time, Zubulake's categories likely will be
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee's note to 2006 amendments, availa-
ble at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/EDiscovery w-
Notes.pdf.
55. Memorandum from Lee H. Rosenthal, Advisory Comm. on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, to David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and
Procedure 34 (May 27, 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Rules
AndPolicies/rules/supctl 105/excerpt_cvreport.pdf.
56. Bearing in mind Rule 34, which pertains to the production of documents, the
basic assumption of discoverability is evident in its provision permitting documents to
be produced either by organizing in accordance with the categories in the request or by
permitting inspection of the documents as they are kept in the ordinary course of
business. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34. It is possible that at least in some cases, a party who
contends that some electronic information is not reasonably accessible might be
required to grant access to an opposing party to permit that opposing party to conduct
her own search.
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superseded by newer technologies,57 and thus, second, the assumption
must be tested under the rule's actual language before relying on it.
Third, the rule refers to burden "or" cost, not burden "and" cost-and
this issue is the subject of the next section.
B. Layers of Reasonableness and Issues of Conflation
The issues attendant in determining accessibility are exacerbated
by the multiple levels of reasonableness built into Rule 26(b)(2)(B).
The general standard for the scope of discovery includes a reasonable-
ness component: "Relevant information need not be admissible at the
trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the dis-
covery of admissible evidence."58 Layered atop this reasonableness
determination is the twofold reasonableness component in Rule
26(b)(2)(B) itself, which renders electronically stored information not
discoverable if "the information is not reasonably accessible" due to
"undue burden or cost."59 If the requesting party seeks a good cause
exception, thereby seeking to render information that is not reasona-
bly accessible discoverable nevertheless, still another reasonableness
determination comes into play as the court inquires whether "the dis-
covery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative. '60 Multiple
layers of reasonableness enhance the opportunity for individual tailor-
ing rather than imposing rigid, inflexible rules, but with a concomitant
reduced protection. The basic scope of discovery-"reasonably calcu-
lated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence"-is broad. Elec-
tronically stored information within this scope is generally
discoverable unless the responding party can demonstrate that the
data is "not reasonably accessible" due to "undue" burden or cost.
As noted above, courts generally have recognized the two-part
inquiry that is necessary under Rule 26. However, there is an addi-
tional component within Rule 26 that has received less attention: the
rule refers to burden "or" cost, not burden "and" cost. Undue burden
may overlap with undue cost, but the rule's drafters chose to join the
57. See Beatty, supra note 31, at 275. (noting that "the complex and ever-changing
storage technology landscape offers a fertile playground for the IT-educated attorney to
challenge the Zubulake classification scheme and its conclusions" and predicting that
"[elventually, evolving technologies will likely render the Zubulake classifications
obsolete").
58. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
59. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i).
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two with the disjunctive "or" rather than the conjunctive "and."61 Cost
alone should not serve as the sole determinant of the discovery of elec-
tronically stored information; if cost were intended as the only factor,
this would render the reference to accessibility superfluous and would
be duplicative of Rule 26(b)(2)(C), which authorizes limits on the
extent of any kind of discovery when the cost outweighs the benefit.
Undue burden can exist without undue cost, and current interpreta-
tions of Rule 26 tend to ignore this possibility.62
The particular issue raised by these multiple layers of reasonable-
ness is the potential for conflating determinations. For example, as
noted above, all discovery is subject to the relevance requirement of
Rule 26(b).63 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has observed, stan-
dards articulated within the Federal Rules addressing discovery neces-
sitate a showing beyond mere relevance:
The specific requirement of good cause would be meaningless if good
cause could be sufficiently established by merely showing that the
desired materials are relevant, for the relevance standard has already
been imposed by Rule 26(b). Thus by adding the words [good cause],
the Rules indicate that there must be a greater showing of need under
Rules 34 and 35 than under the other discovery rules.64
Each layer of reasonableness, because it employs different lan-
guage, must serve a distinctive purpose accomplished through a dis-
tinctive standard.65 Discovery generally, and e-discovery specifically,
invokes multiple layers of reasonableness, which is supposed to be an
61. The Advisory Committee contributed to this problem by referring to burden
and cost in some places, and burden or cost in others. For example, its notes state that
"some sources of electronically stored information can be accessed only with substan-
tial burden and cost," and that in some cases "these burdens and costs may make the
information on such sources not reasonably accessible." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) advi-
sory committee's note to 2006 amendments, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/EDiscovery-.wNotes.pdf (emphasis added). But the
Advisory Committee also noted that "the responding party must show that the identi-
fied sources of information are not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or
cost." Id. (emphasis added).
62. This tendency is illustrated by the focus on cost-shifting, which, although cer-
tainly important, in essence conflates undue burden with undue cost and thereby
treats undue burden as being remedied through cost-shifting-which does nothing to
offset a non-financial burden.
63. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 117 (1964).
64. Id. at 117-18 (quoting Guilford Nat'l Bank of Greensboro v. S. Ry. Co., 297
F.2d 921, 924 (4th Cir. 1962)).
65. See Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992) (noting the canon
of statutory construction to avoid interpretations that would render statutory language
redundant or meaningless).
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objective standard. However, multiple layers require additional analyti-
cal effort, and sometimes the distinctions between the standards are
not clearly delineated and distinguished, creating a risk of conflating
those standards. And specifically in the context of e-discovery, just as
good cause has sometimes mistakenly been equated with relevance,66
so also there is a risk of conflating undue burden with cost and the
proportionality test.
Despite the plain language of Rule 26 referring to undue burden
or cost, it appears that these two alternatives commonly are conflated
into a single consideration-that of CoSt. 67 Because Rule 26's standard
is "not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost," it is
perhaps easy to see why the standard seems collapsible into an "inac-
cessible = costly" equation. However, to do so is to risk according the
standard only one consideration, when in fact there are three: accessi-
bility, undue burden, and undue cost. These three considerations may
overlap-indeed, a court should only find inaccessibility if accessibil-
ity overlaps with either undue burden or undue cost. This overlap,
however, does not justify a merger of considerations.
In particular, the meaning and impact of "undue burden" has
largely been unexplored and unexamined due to the focus on cost.
The cases discussing burdensomeness in the discovery context gener-
ally have been addressing the proportionality test of Rule
26(b)(2)(C)-a provision that limits discovery of all kinds (not just e-
discovery) when "the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
66. See Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 117-18. See generally Henry S. Noyes, Good
Cause Is Bad Medicine for the New E-Discovery Rules, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 77
(2007) ("Unlike matters governed by other Rules, information governed by discovery
rules is already subject to the relevance requirement. The relevance requirement
makes the good cause standard particularly inappropriate for discovery. Indeed, there
is a danger that good cause under Rule 26(b)(2)(B) could be mistakenly conflated
with relevance.").
67. See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 41, at 620 ("[A] generalized approach has devel-
oped [in the courts] that interprets 'undue burden' to mean that the anticipated evi-
dentiary value of the information is outweighed by the economic cost of producing
that information."); PSEG Power N.Y, Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-
657 (DNH/RFT), 2007 WL 2687670, at *9-11 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007) (predicating
undue burden solely on the expense of producing 3000 e-mails); Ameriwood Indus.,
Inc. v. Liberman, No. 4:06CV524-DJS, 2006 WL 3825291, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 27,
2006) (describing the work involved to obtain the requested information, but conclud-
ing that "[gliven the extensive cost involved in performing the tasks, the Court is per-
suaded that defendants have established that the information is not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden and cost").
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outweighs its likely benefit." '68 By analogy, because the proportional-
ity test of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) applies to all discovery, and because the
good cause standard in Rule 26(b)(2)(B) may also encompass the pro-
portionality test,69 it would make no sense to treat the reference to
undue burden in Rule 26(b)(2)(B) as still another application of the
proportionality test. Instead, undue burden pursuant to Rule
26(b)(2)(B) should constitute a standard distinctive from both cost (to
avoid repetition within Rule 26(b)(2)(B)) and the proportionality test
(to avoid repetition with Rule 26(b)(2)(C)). 7 ° Similarly, to overcome a
showing that a source is "not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost" requires good cause-and the meaning of "good cause"
suffers from similar conflation temptations. On the one hand, some
courts might conflate good cause with relevance.71 On the other hand,
good cause also is commonly conflated with the proportionality test of
Rule 26(b)(2)(C),72 yet good cause must mean something more than
the proportionality test to avoid redundancy because "all discovery is
subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C). ''73 One com-
mentator has proposed that in applying the Rule 26(b)(2)(B) good
cause standard, one possibility is that courts should "borrow from the
Rule 26(c) good cause standard [for protective orders] and require a
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). The rule states that in making this assessment
the court should consider "the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the par-
ties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance
of the discovery in resolving the issues." Id.
69. See Noyes, supra note 66, at 71-72 (suggesting that the seven factors in the
Advisory Committee's note accompanying the 2006 e-discovery amendments "may be
simply another redundant reminder that all discovery is subject to the limitations of
Rule 26(b)(2)(C)"); SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, E-DIscOVERY: THE NEWLY AMENDED FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 17 (2006) (supplement to JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE (3d ed. 2006)) (noting that those seven factors "overlap the propor-
tionality considerations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C)").
70. One potential definition of burden in this context might be "time consuming"-
a definition modified, of course, by the reference to "undue." Thus, if reviewing a
source would be excessively time consuming, this should satisfy Rule 26(b)(2)(B)'s
undue burden standard.
71. See Noyes, supra note 66, at 77-78 ("Because many courts do not interpret
good cause to be a rigorous requirement, there is a danger that courts will conflate the
standard with relevance.").
72. Thomas Y. Allman, Conducting E-Discovery After the Amendments: The Second
Wave, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 215, 222 (2009) ("Although 'good cause' is dutifully (and
mechanically) referenced in many of the cases, the courts are, in fact, primarily
focused on proportionality."). But see John L. Carroll, Proportionality in Discovery: A
Cautionary Tale, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 455, 463 (2010) (suggesting that Rule 26's pro-
portionality analysis may be underutilized).
73. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
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particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from
stereotyped and conclusory statements, that failure to permit discov-
ery will cause a clearly defined and serious injury."74
An alternative approach to undue burden in the case law similarly
involves the conflation of undue burden with another distinct Rule
26(b)(2)(B) consideration. This alternative approach incorporates the
consideration of burden within the categorization of presumptively
accessible and presumptively inaccessible sources. In other words,
pursuant to this approach, Zubulake's accessibility categories reflect an
inherent assessment of undue burden: categories designated reasona-
bly accessible are accorded that designation because they do not
involve undue burden, whereas categories designated not reasonably
accessible are accorded that designation because they involve undue
burden. This approach conflates undue burden with accessibility, and
is an undesirable interpretation for precisely that reason. The initial
assessment of discoverability under Rule 26(b)(2)(B) requires an
examination of accessibility, burden, and cost under the fact-specific
case circumstances. The Zubulake categories, while a helpful starting
point, cannot be merged with the consideration of undue burden or
the categories; instead of being a starting point for further evaluation,
they suddenly become determinative. It is no more appropriate to
assume satisfaction of undue burden based on an accessibility cate-
gory than it would be to assume satisfaction of undue cost based on
the accessibility category. The responding party must affirmatively
demonstrate undue burden or cost; it cannot be presumed through the
accessibility category classification alone. Accordingly, as tempting as
it is to conflate inaccessibility, burden, and cost, such an approach
does not comport with the plain language of Rule 26.
Each reasonableness standard in Rule 26 requires a separate and
distinct analysis in order to accord the literal language its due. Moreo-
ver, such a reading is consistent with the correct analysis of e-discovery
pursuant to Rule 26's requirement of both a sensitive, case-specific
analysis, and also an objective analysis.
CONCLUSION
The drafters of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
undertook a difficult task: to render electronically stored information
subject to discovery while retaining sufficient flexibility in the rule's
definitions and applications to enable the rule to accommodate techno-
logical developments. To accomplish its full potential, courts must
74. Noyes, supra note 66, at 92.
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take care to apply an objective reasonableness standard and to avoid
conflating the various separate and distinct standards within the rule.
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